The Philosopher’s Attic

A Happy Burns Day to you all around! Bon appétit with the Haggis…

Scotland the Brave

This is part two of my critical analysis of Steven Pinker’s latest highly acclaimed article in TIME.

We have seen how Steven Pinker synthesizes the last decades of neurophysiological research and the theoretical problems philosophy has had with them.

While addressing the Hard problem of consciousness Pinker neglected to offer the side of John Searle who had addressed physical reduction conscious states to neuronal patterns for quite a while now. This is the underlying problem with Pinker’s article. He simply picks what he likes and leaves out 50% (read 90%) out of the picture.
I understand that everyone writing an article for a popular magazine needs to edit things and limit his scope to certain points. But - as I was taught when I was still working for a daily newspaper and then at University - there is no shame in telling your readers exactly that. “Sorry, limited space and all… I’ll keep to the basics.”
Instead Pinker offers the illusion of a clear picture of the actual and current state of research. Added to this is the fact that he very rarely criticizes the ideas offered by natural scientists. He rarely adds a possible doubt anywhere, or a even rises a possible objection to a dangerously short conclusion. I somehow feel betrayed. Steven Pinker is not doing his job. Or at least not the job I was taught to do, when I studied Philosophy. Let me offer an example:

Take the famous cognitive-dissonance experiments. When an experimenter got people to endure electric shocks in a sham experiment on learning, those who were given a good rationale (”It will help scientists understand learning”) rated the shocks as more painful than the ones given a feeble rationale (”We’re curious.”) Presumably, it’s because the second group would have felt foolish to have suffered for no good reason. Yet when these people were asked why they agreed to be shocked, they offered bogus reasons of their own in all sincerity, like “I used to mess around with radios and got used to electric shocks.”

What is wrong with this picture? The basis of this experiment is the following: I let a bunch of scientist physically abuse me. Even without a rationale, let alone a strong one like the advancement of science, it is clear that there is a moral problem wrapped up in the cognitive one. And Pinker - a philosopher - passes it by like a homeless person in the street: “Ignore it long enough and it will go away”. Is it possible that the people who did get the strong rationale for the experiment felt stronger because they knew that scientists (who are supposed to have higher morale standards) were inflicting them pain in order to advance their science? And would it be possible that the once with a feeble rationale simply felt that something was wrong being inflicted pain without any apparent reason? Once again, the experiment is the problem. Not just the execution. Without knowing it - I hope - the scientists were manipulating their own findings. And all of that because of an absence of moral consideration from their part. And why do we even pay ethical committees in universities?

Apart from the blatant ignoring of critical points in the physical theories he is synthesizing, there is something off in Pinker’s vocabulary.
While talking about consciousness for instance, he always seems to be referring to perception, as if perception was the only thing that made up our consciousness. In fact our consciousness is like a an ever changing picture that can be made up of various conscious states: remembering, reasoning, talking, intellection… thinking. None of them is a purely perceptive state in it’s proper sense, but they require consciousness in a very basic way (as in “I am awake”-conscious) and a more complex way where one conscious state triggers another one (as in “I see a blue car and it reminds me of my first car…”).
On a general basis it can be said that Steven Pinker in addition to ignoring conflicting attitudes to his favorite naturalistic explanations and having a vocabulary that is far from being precise, he also shows an impressively devious motivation. Yes, I dare call Steven Pinker a devious manipulator. Two elements push me towards such a harsh judgment. One is completely inherent to the field of current philosophy and the other is of a more general order. The two are nevertheless intricately linked.

The “I don’t see you, so you don’t see me…” style - The attentive reader will have had a doubt about this tactic from the moment I quoted John Searle’s book The Mystery of Consciousness in the first part of my article. Pinker chooses the same name for his article as one of the great books in the field of the Philosophy of Mind, but not once makes reference to it, probably because citing this book would contest some of his quick drawn conclusions. This tactic is repeated in enough places to just be a simple omission. For instance here:

Sure, you and I both call grass green, but perhaps you see grass as having the color that I would describe, if I were in your shoes, as purple. Or ponder whether there could be a true zombie–a being who acts just like you or me but in whom there is no self actually feeling anything. This was the crux of a Star Trek plot in which officials wanted to reverse-engineer Lieut. Commander Data, and a furious debate erupted as to whether this was merely dismantling a machine or snuffing out a sentient life.

The neat little pop-cultural reference cannot hide the fact that again he is staying quiet about half a library of literature on Zombies as an object of philosophical thought experiments. Since Thomas Nagel published several articles on the nature of philosophical zombies - the oldest dating back as far as 1970⁽¹⁾ (sic!) - there has been a line of texts treating Commander Data, Robots and what not as possible sources of explaining consciousness⁽²⁾. As for the “…what does is feel like…”, the same Thomas Nagel has started that discussion as well with his now famous article “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?”⁽³⁾ and the responses to it are numerous.

So the question at this stage is the following: Why? Cui bono? Where lies the reason for this style and the continuous omissions?
The answer is far more disappointing that anyone could have anticipated. Let me give you a little hint with Goethe: “… one feels the evil intent and feels displeased…”⁽⁴⁾

1. Thomas Nagel, “Armstrong on the Mind”, Philosophical Review, 79 (1970) , pp. 394-403 [back]
2. The latest in the line is Robert Kirk’s Zombies and Consciousness, Oxford University Press, 2006. [back]
3. Thomas Nagel, “What Is it Like to Be a Bat?” in Philosophical Review LXXXIII, 4, (1974); pp. 435-50. [back]
4. J.W. Goethe, Torquato Tasso. [back]

I successfully made the update to Wordpress 2.1 and everything seems to be working like a charm. (Except that my browser will not reflect some of the sidebar changes I made… something to do with the caching system of WP which makes the page quicker to load?)
Even the WYSIWYG Editor looks good now and maybe (just maybe!) I can stop working directly in HTML…

Since WP are not very quick when it get to making new buttons to display on a blog page, I made one myself.

100px x 100px

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120px x 120px

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140px x 140px
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If you would like to include this button yourself, all you have to do is the following:

1. Right-click on the WP button of your liking. Choose “Save picture…” and save the picture to the root folder of your Wordpress blog. Upload to your server root (http://example.com => where all your wp-admin etc. folders are for those that have WP in a different subfolder.)
2. Copy the code according to the button you chose
3. Paste the code into the template (sidebar.php, index.php etc.) of your theme where you would like your button to appear.
4. Change YOURURI to the URI of your blog.
5. Save and upload the themplate file to your server.
6. DONE.

German Sociologist and Professor at the University of Essen Harald Welzer will be issuing a call to German all German Human and Cultural Scientists to show more temerity in assuming their role as indicators of bad social influences and development. He states that:

Without an opening of their field of research and expertise… [the Human Sciences] will not be able to assume their responsible role that is assigned to them by radically new social problems appearing such as ecological change or the threat by globalised class society.⁽¹⁾

I find that a bold thing to state for someone who is issuing this call to German academics working in the Human Sciences. Harald Welzer has been someone who has tried to address a lot of topics posed by current events and an actual need for explanation in society. Granted. I don’t see however why this call should be limited to Germany exclusively.
Galloping globalisation is a fact and although it has its downsides - especially for countries that cannot take part in this processes! - and the dangers of such a processes can only be addressed on a global scale as well. Like with any problem, you need the correct vocabulary and basic configuration to adequately describe it. Skulking protests and holding up banners “globalisation is bad” simply will not do.

It is rather obvious why Welzer’s article is coming out now. It’s WEF week in Davos. And while the Black blocks and other young anarchists start protesting around the world and especially here in Switzerland - Basel and Zürich are the official protest cities, please all tape your windows before leaving the house - and will tear the city centers apart to make a stand against globalisation, one can only wonder where Harald Welzer takes his ideas from. As someone who underlined the importance of accomplishment in public schools, rather than just pedagogical fun and pure knowledge, he seems to forget that in the real globalised world - as opposed to the secluded world of scholarly research - accomplishment is still as important as it ever was.
The opening of our field (Human Sciences) will only be accomplished trough dialogue and temerity, that much is true. When we look at the turn academic discourse has taken since a certain administration has deemed political correctness as the most important speech category or at the problems European intellectuals have with the phrase “Europe has a Christian past and culture…”, nobody can deny the need our society has for more conflictingly and more forceful dialogue. Too many things have not been addressed either by politics or academia while people are left alone with their problems and their musings. The shock of former East Germany voting a neo-nazi party back into local parliament shows how far from the needs and ideas of the polis we really are.

I share Welzer’s call. But not in the same terms. Not in the terms of a charm offensive by the Human scientists to attract more and more people to their topic or cause. The process can only be opened by accessing both ends: the polis and academia.
Like I have stated before, people need to reacquire a certain respect for the Human sciences (kind of hard when they pay for the education of the young generation and all they get is a Gender study in the Everyday Vocabulary of the ordinary working class in Moscow⁽²⁾ while academics have too take off their invisibility cloak and start writing in newspapers and feuilletons again to address what really is on everybody’s minds, rather than ignoring the hot irons of extremism, religious fundamentalism, terror of opinion etc.

Technorati Tags: wef, davos, germany, sociology, human sciences, harald welzer, die zeit

1. Die Zeit, Nr. 5 - 25. Januar 2007 [back]
2. This is not a joke. Happened in my year and I - with my The Quarrel around the Intellect in the XIIIth century: The case of the so called (non-existent) Latin Averroism - looked really nerdy alongside such a posh topic… [back]

This is the first part in a critical analysis of Steven Pinker’s latest highly acclaimed article in TIME. In the following, I will try to give a better insight into the general field of discussions about consciousness in the philosophy of mind. This will serve two purposes: situate Pinker’s claims more clearly in the landscape of the current research and offer my own view on the article and it’s deficiencies.

Do I think or does my brain think? - Is my joy I feel while passing my exams only a bio-chemical reaction in my brain? - Is love only a matter of a chemical bodily reaction to another being’s scent? - Is my jealousy only due to a misconfiguration in my brain? - Is paedophilia just a question of the wrong neurons firing in the wrong place?

Since 1985, when Oliver Sacks published his now famous book The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat ⁽¹⁾, modern sciences have planted a doubt to the mind of every living person involved in philosophy that our 20th century view on the consciousness and the brain are not as clear cut as we had come to believe since the founding texts by Freud and Jung. Then - some ten years later - came Antonio Damasio’s book on Descartes: called Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain⁽²⁾. Although the author did not succeed in his attempt to annihilate Descartes dichotomy of the res cogitans and the res extensa (mostly due to blatant errors and a basic misunderstanding of Descartes theories and vocabulary) he nevertheless mentioned a case study from the 19th century on how brain damage causes personality and character change: Phineas Gage. Suffering from a massive brain injury, Phineas Gage started to change into a completely different person: from patient to irascible; from balanced, caring and loving to a egoistic, sociopathic drunk.

With the technical progress in medical imaging processes and the advance in bio-chemical analysis the doubt planted, started to grow: what if concepts such as mind, character, memory, personality, consciousness etc. are just a matter of the physicality of the brain? Where before only philosophers had the vocabulary to describe human behaviour, suddenly natural sciences (neurophysiology or biochemistry for instance) claimed their place and given rise to new interdisciplinary fields - such as neurophilosophy or neurophenomenology - and masses of published materials.

Once in a while someone tries to step out of the technicality of this brand new, buzzing topic and offers an insight on some of the latest findings and their consequences on our theoretical concepts and the basis of our world. It’s in this spirit that Steven Pinker - probably the thinker that is most criticised, ridiculed and probably hated by his peers in philosophy - has started to publish popular books that, although they are written in technical language - are still accessible for a larger public than the odd philosophy journal article.
The Language Instinct⁽³⁾ started a small riot in the circle of well-meaning parents and teachers that had not yet come into contact with Chomsky’s Theory of Generative Grammar. A theory - even more criticised than Pinker, since it was not based on factual or practical evidence in any way - that claimed that grammar was innate in human beings and thus that language was innate. Nobody had made a bolder claim in a time where empirical theory had the upper hand in any scientific discussion (also due to the advancement in natural sciences), since Descartes started off the discussion about innate ideas for modern times - the quarell is in fact much older - that led in the end to two schools of thought (rationalism vs. empiricism). Chomsky however had no interest in vulgarising his work or making it more understandable for anybody. In fact I do know a few linguists who say that Chomsky’s articles on Generative Grammar and the subsequent theory on X’ are quite unreadable per se. It’s thanks to Steven Pinker that this all became a bit more tangible.
Another - highly controversial book - was The Blank Slate⁽⁴⁾ which has become a best-seller shortly after it came out. In a way it is Pinker’s best book since he was one of the first philosopher’s to contest the utility of political correctness based on the fear of inequality. His boldest claim was - at a time where teachers of the generation of ‘68 had managed to indoctrinate every politician into believing that all kids had the same standards and that using traditional teaching methods was equal to cruelty - that not everyone had the same intellectual capacities and that thus the idea of the human mind as a ‘blank slate’ needed ot be overthrown without the fear of losing political equality.

“Political equality does not require sameness but policies that treat people as individuals with rights.⁽⁵⁾

Of course the possible moral consequences of such a claim is obvious: any murderer will give his genetics as a reason for his crime. But Pinker’s answer is even simpler than this attack to his idea. Genetics do not determinate current actions. If that were the case a murderer wouldn’t run from the police, since he knows the consequences of his actions. Foreseeing these consequences and deliberation before action prevail over any determination by genetics. (For other critiques of Pinker’s There is no such thing as a Blank Slate be sure to have a look at Louis Menand’s article in the New Yorker.)

Now, Steven Pinker is back. Not with a book, but with an article in TIME Magazine called “The Mystery of Consciousness”.
Like always Pinker writes in fashionable, easy accessible manner about some of the problems (natural and human) scientists have in explaining the consciousness. He has lost however - in my view - some of his edge when it comes to accurate description of theoretical complexities. (I will not address the fact that he does not offer any reference of the works he is citing, since this might also be to the on-line version of the article. However, I think it’s a real pain in case someone wanted to do some further reading. I will add the missing references as I go.) Again, he is trying to take physical evidence from natural sciences such as medicine, biochemistry etc. and shows the influences these findings have on our everyday morals, but also the field of philosophy as such. This has been Pinker’s modus operandi for years and it has worked. But I can’t help it, his conclusions are too rash in certain places.
For instance, speaking about the hard problem and the easy problem
about consciousness:

Although neither problem⁽⁶⁾ has been solved, neuroscientists agree on many features of both of them, and the feature they find least controversial is the one that many people outside the field find the most shocking. Francis Crick⁽⁷⁾ called it “the astonishing hypothesis”–the idea that our thoughts, sensations, joys and aches consist entirely of physiological activity in the tissues of the brain. Consciousness does not reside in an ethereal soul that uses the brain like a PDA; consciousness is the activity of the brain.

While in The Blank Slate Pinker established himself as the master of pointing out a non-sequitur, here he seems to have fallen into the pit while staring at the wondrous sun shining from the natural sciences.
Since the early 90ies - when John Searle published The Mystery of Consciousness⁽⁸⁾ and The Rediscovery of the Mind⁽⁹⁾ - there has been an ongoing debate about scientific reductionism. In fact Searle was one of the first to address this danger within the field of Philosophy. And since then his assertion that just because natural science can explain that stimulus X can cause brain function Y(X) does not mean that this biochemical, neurological etc. explanation substitutes any theoretical philosophical explanation of epistemology. (cf. Searle’s theories on AI, the Chinese Room Argument et altera).
It is obvious why: if the Philosopher is not the one telling the Neurologist what he needs to look for, he wont know what he’s looking at in an EEG. Yes, my thought of green pastures does correspond to a neuronal fire ‘green pastures’ in my brain, but it is not reducible to it alone. Consciousness reduced to simple brain function. If that were the case we would have found the cure for 3 point Glasgow-coma-scale patients. Brain function can be reproduced, can be trigged. If consciousness was purely a matter of brain function, we wouldn’t have the explanation problems we are having.
These arguments are well known in the field and one can only wonder how Pinker manages to be so sloppy.

1. Oliver Sacks, The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat, Duckworth, 1985. [back]
2. Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, 1995. [back]
3. Steven Pinker, The language instinct, Harper, 1994. [back]
4. Steven Pinker, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Viking, 2002. [back]
5. Steven Pinker, Keynote Address at Harvard University, 2005. [back]
6. This terminology - the hard and the easy problem - was first introduced by David Chalmers in his article “Facing Up to the Problems of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies 2(3):200-19, 1995 and expanded in his response to critics “Moving Forward on the Problems of Consciousness” in Journal of Consciousness Studies 4(1):3-46. [back]
7. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search For The Soul, Scribner reprint edition, 1995. [back]
8. John R. Searle, The Mystery of Consciousness, 1990. [back]
9. John R. Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, MIT Press, 1992. [back]

Herbert Grönemeyer has got to be one of the most interesting, compelling and (most of the time) polarised German singer of our times. With over 20 albums made over the years and several platinum records and singles, an interesting actor career and some quite weird (hence polarising) song texts, he can - in my opinion - claim to be one of THE last real German vocal artists at the moment.
(Compare it with what Germany has to offer at the moment: Tokyo Hotel, Monrose, and all the other Casting bands from all the various franchises out
there… I am not counting Xavier Naidoo into the equation, since his career counts about a quarter of the length of Grönemeyers.)

Throughout Grönemeyer’s various albums there are several highlights, like “Kinder an die Macht” (Give children the power) or “Männer” (Men) etc., but one topic is almost always present: discrimination. In “Musik nur wenn sie laut ist” for instance he is describing a young girl dance. Everything seems fine, until we learn in the Chorus that she is in fact deaf and - hence the title - she likes music only when it’s loud. In “Bochum” he sings about his city, which is known throught the world as being one of the most industrial towns of Germany in the middle of the Ruhrgebiet. But with
his lyrics he manages to show that although people don’t like the town, it is still home.

These all are different articulations of discrimination - the girl that we would only pity if we knew beforehand of her handicap, the ugly town - turned upside down and exposed by brilliant lyrics.

As the driven person that he is, Grönemeyer couldn’t help but be affected by the turn of current events in the last years. Religious fanaticism or any other militantism endangering our society, our integrity and our humanity from all sides have been our constant shadow since September 11, but actually already way before that could the signs be seen. Grönemeyer addresses these issues in an album that will hit the stores in March. The first single “Stück vom Himmel” (A piece of heaven) however, has been released to the radio stations last week and will be available to buy around February 2nd.

Here is the text and if you can find it on a radio station, please listen: this is someone with a plea.

Literal translation by Yseult. The lyrics of “Stück vom Himmel” are the property of Herbert Grönemeyer and his Record company EMI. The English translation is my own and may be copied with a link to this post. Thank you.

UPDATE: The single has now been released and the accompanying video can be viewed (and thus the song heard) directly at Grönemeyer’s homepage (in the top left corner, under the artists name). This is a slightly slimmed down version compared to the one that was released for the radio.

Technorati Tags: grönemeyer, music, german, singer, stück vom himmel

It has been brought to my attention that I might have been a bit too harsh on treating with Battlestar Galactica and Philosophy like I did. After a slightly heated discussion it was suggested to me by that same person that rather than articulating myself against such a book or the way the publisher has done his call of paper, I should have given some advice on how it should have been done according to me. I might have been too harsh in my previous post. I might have been unclear about certain points. But then again: maybe not.

However this may be, I’d like to clarify several points. (Especially since someone else has sent me an email probing my interest in a volume on Depeche Mode and Philosophy…)

• I am not against the use of pop cultural references in order to bring people in contact with philosophical concepts and theories they would otherwise never have come across.
• I am not against pop culture. (In fact, I am interested in pop culture like anyone living in this world: tv shows, series, films, cinema, bestsellers, comics, music etc.)
• I do not plead for a esoteric use of philosophy in general or the history of philosophy in particular. Philosophy is for everyone. That’s the way it’s supposed to be. Period.
• I do not plead for an aristocratic use of philosophy either, where the academic philosophers are the ones that hold the only true view on the big chapter of human sciences labeled Philosophy.
• I do not hate Battlestar Galactica.

The first point seems the most important one to me. So what is all this fuss about then? If I am not against the use of popular culture in exemplifying philosophical concepts, why did I write that first lengthy entry?

Several answers are possible here and I will make it just as plain as before.

1. I don’t think that taking people to be complete imbeciles is a good way to get “normal” people in touch with philosophical concepts.
2. I don’t think that you have to water absolutely everything down in order to get academic philosophy to be understood by philosophical lay people.
3. I strongly believe that everything is a matter of code. Failed communication, lost interest, contempt for something or someone etc.: all a matter of code.
   This means that it’s about “how do I say XYZ” and not what XYZ really are. (This is why rhetorical manipulation really works btw. Watch one of the speeches of the greatest manipulators of the last century (addressing his HJ) to prove my point.)
4. Philosophy today and in history is articulated and kept alive within two distinct places: academia and agora. There are professional philosophers and there are people interested and well read in philosophy. These areas need to mingle but have to be kept distinct for the sake of the quality level on both “sides”. And the mingling is where the crux lies.

So for me the question - that obviously nobody in academic philosophy has the guts to ask due to so many prejudice surrounding our profession - that follows the first step (i.e. how can we get people in touch with philosophical concepts that they would never have otherwise approached?) is: Which code do we choose? Do we choose the code of the addressed and try to stay hip (as seen with the Gender-Inclusive Bible or the German Street Slang Version of the Bible or Strine Slang Bible) by choosing their code, or do we try to impassionate them for what we really do by showing how we do it?

As usual it all comes down to attention. And these pop cultural initiatives do have the dirty feel of attention seekers for the sake of attention by all means.

What I would wish the editors of the Blackwell Pop Culture and Philosophy series to do is choose Battlestar Galactica as a matrix for exemplifying certain theories and problems philosophy has to deal with at the moment (cloning, AI etc.) instead of claiming that Battlestar Galactica is the ultimate Philosophy Show.

In a discussion about this the comparison with Matrix has been drawn. Matrix cannot be compared to the Blackwell Project in any way. The Matrix Trilogy has been written as an application about the dream vs. reality theorem in the history of thought. It was thought up that way and the writers have been so strict about this that the end of the Matrix Revolutions can hardly be understood without a degree in Modern Realism Debate. (I wonder if J. R. Searle and H. Putnam ever got together and watched the movies in light of their ongoing quarrel…)
Matrix - for me - is the prime example how complex philosophical concepts (dating as far back as Descartes genius malignus theorem) that were thought up and published in a highly technical language can be adapted and shaped up into a modern, pop cultural visual experience without losing its profundity. Of course it lost some tech-aficionados with the third part which in my opinion is purely philosophical, but never mind that.
Matrix became a phenomenon because it was philosophical. Because it offered a whole library of possible discussion topics. Matrix did not become first a phenomenon that we discussed philosophically afterwards or tried to cut to fit into certain philosophical categories. I dearly would hope -for the sake of our profession - the editors of the Blackwell series would try to live up to this standard instead of seeking for attention by any means.

Ah, yes… and please leave Depeche Mode where it belongs: my ears and my free time. Everything can be analysed philosophically, even the wandering of the earthworm. But does it have to be?